IN THE EDUCATION LABOUR RELATIONS COUNCIL
CASE REFERENCE: ELRC897-25/26WC

In the dispute between:

Perciance Taazadza Applicant

And

Western Cape Education Department (WCED) Respondent

Date: 25 May 2026

Panellist: M. Chennells

ARBITRATION AWARD

DETAILS OF MATTER AND REPRESENTATION

1. The arbitration hearing was set down for 7 May 2026 at 09h00. The proceedings took place on the Microsoft Teams online platform.
2. The Applicant is Perciance Taazadza, who was employed by the Respondent, the Western Cape Education Department (hereinafter interchangeably referred to as “the Respondent”, “the WCED” and “the Department”) and worked at the St Vincent R.C. Primary School.
3. The Applicant represented herself in the proceedings, and the Respondent was represented by Zuziwe Ngqokombe, a Labour Relations Officer.
4. The Respondent raised an in limine point concerning the jurisdiction of the Council to arbitrate the dispute, arguing that the Applicant was not dismissed.
5. A hearing was held on the in limine matter and a ruling issued, in terms of which it was found that the Applicant was dismissed.
6. On 7 May 2026, the parties then convened for the hearing into the unfair dismissal dispute.
7. The parties agreed that the evidence presented in the in limine process would form part of the record of evidence for the determination of the in limine issue.
8. The matter was conducted in English and digitally recorded.

BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE

9. The Applicant commenced a fixed-term contract with the Respondent, placed at St Vincent R.C. Primary School, on 1 January 2025. The Applicant had previously been employed on fixed-term contracts by the Respondent.
10. She was employed as a ‘post-level 1’ Educator.
11. According to the Respondent, the Applicant earned gross monthly remuneration of R42 935.45 (comprising R31 339.75 in basic salary and R11 595.70 in additional remuneration in lieu of benefits). The Applicant submitted that she earned monthly total remuneration of R40 120.10 (comprising basic salary of R29 284.75 and R10 835.35 in lieu of benefits).
12. Ms. Ngqokombe explained that the Respondent’s figures reflect the salary increase which came in in April 2025.
13. The Applicant submits that the expiry date of this contract was 31 December 2025. The Respondent submitted that it was a six-month contract, i.e., expiring on 30 June 2025.
14. The Respondent submits that the following the six-month term of the contract, the school had nominated the Applicant for appointment in an additional fixed-term position (i.e., for the effective extension or renewal of the contract), but that this was not approved.
15. The Applicant submits that on 22 October 2025, or the following day, she was dismissed in the circumstances dealt with in the evidence discussed below and in the in limine ruling.
16. The Applicant noted that she is also claiming ‘statutory monies’ allegedly owed to her by the Respondent. This may be consolidated with the unfair dismissal dispute in terms of s 74(2) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (provided it is found that she was dismissed).

ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

17. It must be determined whether the Applicant’s dismissal was procedurally and substantively fair.
18. The Applicant sought compensation for the alleged unfair dismissal.

SURVEY OF EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT

19. At the outset of the process, in explaining Why she believes her dismissal is unfair, the applicant said that she did not get any notice but was simply told her contract to be terminated well she must not come to work, and she said it was referred to that she was a foreign national and that immigration status was an issue.
20. The applicant confirmed that she was challenging the procedural and substantial fairness of her dismissal.
21. Faniswa Mpondombini, an HR Clerk for the Respondent, appeared as a witness for the WCED.
22. Mpondombini testified that she wrote a letter on 22 October, stating that the nomination had been received but was not approved by the delegated authority (Christal Myburgh, Assistant Director: Recruitment & Selection).
23. Mpondombini stated that the Applicant was not teaching ‘STEM’ subjects, and that as per the 2024 circular (see para 28 of the in limine ruling) which states that in order to be able to teach at high school level, foreign nationals must teach such subjects. She said that the Applicant was a ‘foundation phase’ teacher in primary school.
24. Mpondombini stated that she received the nomination. She said that someone came to her in, she thinks, early October with this nomination. And she said she was asked where the submission was for this nomination. Mpondombini said she never received it and that she would draft the submission to get an approval from the delegated authority.
25. Mpondombini said that in this case, the delegated authority was the Assistant Director, Myburgh. She said she took the nomination, drafted submissions and submitted them to the delegated authority and it was not approved.
26. Mpondombini said the nomination was received in October for a contract from 1 July to 31 December 2025.
27. Ms. Ngqokombe asked whether it was not strange that a nomination for a contract from July to the end of the year was only being sent to the Recruitment and Selection department in October 2025. She asked Mpondombini whether she knew why it was only received then.
28. Mpondombini responded that in the nomination is a recommendation which must be signed by Myburgh. She said Myburgh had received it on 6 August and that, thereafter, the school uploads a document on the system which must be signed off by Myburgh. Then, she said, the establishment can create or reserve the post. And, she said, then they need to send it to “admin”, Mpondombini’s section.
29. Mpondombini said that after Myburgh received the nomination, she drafted the submission for approval of the appointment and they then picked up that the Applicant was not teaching STEM subjects, and that therefore the nomination was disapproved.
30. With reference to para 8.7 of the circular (as set out in para 28 of the ruling), Mpondombini stated that the department gives preference to foreign educators who teach certain subjects at high school, on account of the consideration of critical skills. She referred to subjects like mathematics, science and technology. She said not so many people can teach these subjects.
31. She said this is not a preference per se but relates to scarce skills.
32. Mpondombini explained the role of a principle of a school in respect of nominations. She said the Principal is supposed to source suitably qualified educators and that once this is done, nomination documents must be uploaded. She said that there is also provision made for a motivation for the appointment of the relevant educator.
33. Mpondombini testified that for “contract appointments”, the delegated authority lies in Recruitment and Selection. And she said in this case the Assistant Director gives the approval.
34. Ms. Ngqokombe put it to Mpondombini that the Applicant was claiming that when she received the letter in question, it served as termination of a contract of employment (this is evidently a reference to the letter dated 22 October 2025 (referred to in para 27 of the ruling).
35. Mpondombini disputed this, saying that the Applicant’s contract had ended on 30 June and by that time (i.e., 22 October 2025), the Department had no contract with her.
36. Mpondombini said that all that the Department had with the Applicant at the time was a nomination from school. She said the contract was terminated.
37. Ms. Ngqokombe noted that the circular provides that before an appointment is made, approval must be obtained and that this must be done at least two weeks prior to the assumption of duty.
38. Asked whether a nomination gives an employee a guarantee of appointment, Mpondombini said it means that the Principal has nominated the educator, but she said the approval lies with the head office.
39. Mpondombini explained that the circular was published in 2024, but only implemented in 2025 as they were unable to implement it immediately.
40. Mpondombini said that when the Department was dealing with the application concerning the Applicant, the circular had been published already but not implemented.
41. She stated that the Department was required to comply with the circular. She referred to the requirements concerning the types of subjects, etc.
42. It was put to Mpondombini that the Applicant had submitted that she should have been given notice of termination by the WCED prior to the October letter. She responded that there was no contract, and that it had ended on 30 June.
43. Under cross-examination, it was put to Mpondombini that the Principal had sourced the Applicant for the post in question. The Applicant put it to her that Myburgh had said it was an additional post. She asked Mpondombini why, if the Department knew that this post was vacant, no one was sent to stand in in the post.
44. Mpondombini responded that, firstly, the Principal does not appoint staff but merely nominates them. She said this is why they refer to nomination documents as opposed to appointment documents. And she said that Myburgh recommends what the Principal has motivated or nominated, but the approval lies with the Recruitment and Selection department. She added that the question of why the Department did not send an educator to the school was not their scope of work. She said it is the Principal’s duty to ensure that an educator is in front of a child and that this is not the scope of Recruitment and Selection’s responsibilities. She said the Principal manages and oversees what happens in the school on behalf of the Department.
45. The Applicant put it to Mpondombini that she did not go to the school on her own, and she asked whose problem it is that processing and recruitment takes so much time. Mpondombini said she, or the Department or her Department, did not know the Applicant was at the school. She said that they only count the time they received the documents.
46. Mpondombini stated that the Department does not or would not know that the Applicant was at home.
47. The Applicant asked, then, why she was mentioned in the letter, when the Department knew she was not employed at all. Mpondombini said this was because they had the nomination documents.
48. The Applicant put it to Mpondombini that the Principal, who works on behalf of the Department and is her immediate boss, told the Applicant that they were waiting (impliedly for the nomination to be processed). The Applicant said she even asked the Principal about her salary and she was told that they were waiting for matters concerning the Applicant’s work permit, which had expired. She also raised with Mpondombini the letter which was addressed to the principle asking her to submit the Applicant’s new renewed permit (seemingly the correspondence set out in para 19 of the ruling). She said that this shows that the Department was aware that the Applicant was at the school, or working at the school.
49. Mpondombini said she had answered this, saying the Department was not aware the Applicant was at the school.
50. Mpondombini stated that the email in question (which is dated 11 August 2025 and was sent by Clint Walker) was part of the processing of the nomination.
51. The Applicant asked her whether the Department has put anything in place to deal with the fact that educators will be at work while the processes are being carried out. The Applicant said that the staff at the Department’s call centre know her and matters concerning her employment, indicating that she regularly inquired about these issues.
52. Mpondombini said that Myburgh received the nomination on 6 August, and that the email referred to was sent on 11 August, saying that there was not even a week between them. So, she asked what the Applicant meant when she said that it took time.
53. The Applicant indicated she was referring to the delay between the time that she was allowed to work by the Principal, impliedly until the nomination was processed.
54. Mpondombini stated that Walker’s email does not say that the Applicant’s nomination had been approved, but just says that she needed to submit her new permit.
55. Mpondombini indicated that this was part of the processing of nominations, when documents are checked and it is noted that anything is outstanding.
56. The Applicant referred to having been in the post for ten years.
57. The Applicant, Perciance Taazadza, appeared as a witness in support of her case.
58. The Applicant said she performed her duties and was not guilty of any misconduct or wrongdoing.
59. She said that since she worked, she thinks it is good that the department would reward her (perhaps an implied reference to remuneration).
60. The Applicant said that since the dismissal, her life has become difficult. She said that she had a salary she could rely on but that the dismissal was so abrupt and that she couldn’t prepare herself or family.
61. The Applicant stated that she was employed by the SGB from October to December. She said, however, that she only signed a contract with the SGB this year (2026).
62. The Applicant also said that usually when her salary payment is delayed, the school will give her an advance (that she can pay back).
63. The Applicant stated that she is working for the SGB at R10 000 per month.
64. She referred to the monies received from the SGB as being a stipend. But she also confirmed that she was employed by the SGB at the time of the arbitration.
65. The Applicant explained that she now works in a different role, teaching a grade two class of academically challenged children.
66. She explained that, while she worked until the end of October for the SGB, she was paid from 1 November.
67. Under cross-examination, the Applicant confirmed that she was employed on a fixed-term contract in January 2025.
68. As to what the Principal had said to her when they met following the letter being sent to the principle by their department, the Applicant said that the principle told her the department no longer required her services, because she is a foreign national.
69. The Applicant confirmed she was given the letter to read, or a copy of it, and that she understood the contents of it.
70. The Applicant confirmed that there was nothing mentioning termination of a contract in the letter.
71. As to why she says that the letter constitutes proof of the termination of her employment or contract, she said that the Principal was her immediate boss and the person under whose instructions she worked.
72. She said that the Principal told her that she could no longer work for the Department and that the department did not want to employ her anymore.
73. Ms. Ngqokombe asked the Applicant whether the Principal said the Department was terminating her fixed-term contract. The Applicant responded in the affirmative, saying the Principal said they were not going to employ her anymore and that she was terminated.
74. The Applicant testified that she worked from July, into August and through September and October and that no one spoke to her, not even the Principal.
75. She said that when she asked why her salary was overdue, she was told that they were waiting on the Department.
76. The Applicant said that on the day that the Principal met with her, she asked the Applicant if she could help until the end of the year in an SGB post. The Applicant confirmed she accepted the offer, but (perhaps somewhat confusingly) she disputed that this meant that she no longer had a contract with the Department. She explained that she needed money to survive and that this channel (impliedly her employment by the department) had been blocked for her.
77. She stated that this was the only thing on the table, but that she still wondered why the Department had done what they did.
78. The Applicant said she thought that maybe the Department wanted her to prepare the children for systemic tests, indicating that, along this line of thought, they would then throw her out, so to speak, when she was no longer needed.
79. The Applicant confirmed that any money she received as an advance from the school had to be paid back. She indicated she received such an advance in July, August, September and October. She said this was caused by the culture of the department, an implied reference to delayed payment of salaries.
80. Ms. Ngqokombe ask the Applicant why, if she accepted a post with the SGB, she should be paid double, referring to her seeking compensation. The Applicant responded that the SGB paid her R10 000.
81. Ms. Ngqokombe submitted in response that the Applicant accepted this willingly but that she was also arguing that she should be paid until the end of December 2025. And she asked why she then accepted this offer if she was still of the view that she was an employee of the Department until the end of December.
82. The Applicant said that the arrangement with the school was that if the Department pays her until the end of December, then she would have to pay the money advanced to her back. She said this was a church school which does not charge fees and is running low on money.
83. Ms. Ngqokombe asked why the Applicant would pay the school back given that she is rendering a service. She said she would do so because, if the Department pays up to December, then the right thing to do is to pay the money back as she inconvenienced them by taking this money.
84. As to whom promised the Applicant payment until December, she referred to the email sent by Cornelia Bailey set out in para 23 of the ruling. Ms. Ngqokombe asked whether it was fair for her to claim unfair dismissal based on the subject line of an email. The Applicant said, “Yes, and I worked”.
85. Ms. Ngqokombe submitted in her closing statement that it would be unfair for the Department to be liable for the work performed by the Applicant without the approval of the relevant authorities of the Department.
86. She said that if the Applicant was to be paid, it would create a precedent that one can work without any appointment letter and without any contract of employment. She said that then, anyone would be able to wake up, go to school and later create a claim with the council.
87. In her closing statement, the Applicant stated that the Principal is an employee, a representative of the Department, and the person who employed her. She said she does not know what was happening between the Principal and the Department or what their communications were behind the scenes. But, she said, she was requested to perform a duty which she did well. She indicated that if she was not supposed to be there, the Principal would have informed her that her services were not required. Then, she said, she would not have gone to work. But, she said, the Principal promised that it was an additional post, a WCED post, and that the Principal permitted her to work.
88. So, the Applicant stated, to tell her that she cannot be compensated for the work rendered would be very cruel.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT

Unfair dismissal dispute

89. I note that from the Applicant’s framing of the dispute and her submissions and evidence, she is not claiming that she had a reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed-term contract (or of being retained on an indefinite basis), as contemplated in Section186(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”), but instead she alleged her employment was terminated during the term of a fixed-term contract.
90. I will recap certain of the facts discussed and findings made in the jurisdictional ruling, which are applicable to this part of the dispute (concerning the fairness of the dismissal).
91. I accept based on the evidence that, at least from an administrative perspective, the Applicant was appointed on a fixed-term contract commencing on (or with effect from) 1 January 2025 and terminating or expiring on (or with effect from) 30 June 2025. The nomination form (dated 8 January 2025) with covering letter (dated 14 January 2025) refers.
92. These documents show that the Principal was applying for the Applicant to be appointed on a six-months fixed-term contract, starting and ending on the above-mentioned dates, respectively. This application was evidently approved by the Respondent.
93. The cover letter shows, in addition, that, as was confirmed by Myburgh, the post in question was assigned to the school in the staff establishment for 2025 for the entire period in question, i.e., 1 January to 31 December 2025.
94. I also accept based on the evidence that the Principal applied on behalf of the school for the Applicant to be appointed on a further six-months contract for the period 1 July to 31 December 2025. The signed nomination form dated 5 August 2025 refers.
95. I accept that, as was argued by Ms. Ngqokombe, the Applicant was neither in the senior or FET phases nor teaching STEM subjects and that, therefore, the Respondent could not approve her nomination in terms of the relevant circular.
96. The circular, which I accept as being binding on the Department, provides, in short, that foreign national educators may only be employed if there is no new entrant to employment that can be appointed and with reference to their ability to fulfil critical skills in the workforce of the Department, aside from the need for their employment to be approved by the Recruitment and Selection department or directorate.
97. Mpondombini’s evidence indicates that the circular was implemented from 2025 (despite having been issued earlier) and she testified that they were required to follow it, with reference to the types of subjects taught by educators.
98. I, therefore, accept it as established based on the evidence that the reason for the termination of the Applicant’s employment was her inability to teach STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) subjects in the Seniorand FET (Further Education and Training) phases. It is common cause that her skills and qualifications do not comply with this requirement.
99. I accept this as being, ultimately, a fair reason for termination of the Applicant’s employment.
100. I accept that the relevant officials of the Respondent, including Myburgh, in terminating the Applicant’s employment (which ultimately amounts to a dismissal, as previously found) were following the prescripts imposed on them by the Department and/or the relevant empowering statutory provisions (as set out in the circular and including the Employment of Educators Act 76 of 1998 and the Personnel Administrative Measures (‘PAM’) document). It may be that the relevant bargaining council collective agreement or agreements also have some relevance in this framework of empowering provisions and prescripts.
101. In addition, aside from the Department following these requirements in terminating the Applicant’s employment, I have no reason not to accept the validity of the reasoning provided (i.e. with reference to the employment of foreign national educators and their ability or otherwise to offer scarce skills).
102. There is an element of ‘impossibility of performance’ in the reasons for which the Applicant was dismissed. In other words, compliance with these prescripts meant her employment could not be confirmed or approved.
103. It is important to consider that the shortcomings which resulted in the Applicant’s employment being terminated are not things which she would be able to comply with in the short term. We are, therefore, dealing with something different to a situation where, for example, an employee should be given a reasonable opportunity to take steps to ensure compliance with requirements, with which the failure to comply would result in dismissal (for example in some cases of incapacity).
104. In other types of cases of impossibility of performance – where, for example, accreditations are easily or reasonably attainable but an employee must take steps to obtain them to allow them to fulfil a role – ordinarily, an employer must give an employee a reasonable opportunity to correct the issues preventing them from fulfilling the role, before the decision to dismiss can be fairly taken. This matter is distinguishable from such cases, because the Applicant evidently quite simply does not comply with the relevant requirements set out in the circular.
105. For these reasons, I must find that the Applicant’s dismissal is or was substantively fair.
106. The question of the procedural fairness of the Applicant’s dismissal is, of course, separate, as is the question of appropriate relief for a finding of procedural unfairness.
107. In both of these respects, the sequence of events which saw the Applicant work beyond the date of her original fixed-term contract and the administrative miscommunications or failures on the Respondent’s part are relevant.
108. Notwithstanding the objective evidence of what the administrative status of her employment was, the Applicant testified that she understood her appointment to be on a twelve-month basis, with her contract due to terminate on 31 December 2025 based on the effluxion of time (i.e., on the expiry of the fixed-term contract). Importantly, there is no evidence to gainsay or contradict her version in this regard (in fact, there is evidence supporting this version, with reference to the subject line of the email dated 27 May 2025, sent to the Applicant by Bailey).
109. The expiry date of the Applicant’s fixed-term contract differed between, on one hand, what was documented and administratively determined by the Respondent (subject to the inconsistency contained in the subject line of the 27 May email), and on the other hand, what was communicated to her and what she understood the situation to be.
110. There is no evidence indicating anything was shared with the Applicant informing her or confirming that she was employed on a six-months fixed-term contract, as opposed to one with a twelve-months term. There was no contract or appointment letter, for example, stating this.
111. It was the Applicant’s undisputed version that she worked in the same post in the year prior (2024) for the entire twelve months from 1 January. This also supports her version that she believed the term of the contract to be twelve months (even if different rules and regulations were in place, as was testified to by Myburgh).
112. I find that the Applicant was employed beyond the expiry of her initial fixed-term contract (i.e., beyond 30 June 2025). Evidently, the Applicant’s understanding was that she was employed on a fixed-term basis, as opposed to indefinite.
113. Myburgh’s evidence implied a belief or argument that any failure by the Principal to have informed the Applicant of the expiry date of the contract, or that her employment had terminated as at 30 June 2025, cannot be imputed onto the Respondent.
114. But the Applicant’s testimony, which alluded to the Principal being the Department for all intents and purposes as far as she was concerned, holds true on the evidence. The testimony of both of the Respondents’ witnesses, too, supports this notion.
115. The fact that the Principal, in the probable knowledge that the Applicant was still working in the same role beyond the original expiry date, submitted the nomination form only in August 2025, underlines the apparent failure on the Principal’s part to act diligently and with due care in the fulfilment of her duties.
116. In these circumstances, apparently with no warning and without any knowledge of the requirements determined by the circular, the Applicant was given ‘minute notice’ that her employment was terminated. She was summarily dismissed, having worked in the role for over a year and a half, and seemingly having worked for the Department for years longer than that.
117. The evidence shows that on 22 or 23 October 2025, the Principal called the Applicant in and showed her the letter dated 22 October 2025 and informed her that the Department had not approved her appointment. The evidence shows, further, that at the same time, the Applicant was asked to continue serving the school in an SGB post until the end of the year. The Applicant testified that her employment with the Respondent terminated on the day of that discussion, and I accepted that this was indeed the case based on the evidence.
118. The evidence shows that the Applicant’s dismissal was procedurally unfair.
119. None of the fundamental or minimum requirements of a fair dismissal as set out in the applicable Code of Good Practice: Dismissal issued in terms of the LRA, or those discussed in Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA and Others [JR782/05] [2006] ZALC 44; (2006) 27 ILJ 1644 (LC); [2006] BLLR 833 (LC), were complied with by the Department.
120. Instead, in circumstances in which I have found that her employment continued beyond 30 June 2025, on 22 or 23 October 2025, the Applicant was summarily dismissed in a meeting, without any opportunity to state her case before the decision was taken and without any notice that the termination of her employment was considered.
121. I understand the circumstances which resulted in the events that unfolded, including the sequence of events which saw the Applicant work beyond the date of her original fixed-term contract and the administrative miscommunications or failures on the Respondent’s part. But these can only mitigate so much against the inconvenience experienced by the Applicant and the prejudice suffered by her, given that the events were the result of failures by the Principal and/or the Department and, importantly, through no fault of the Applicant’s.
122. This is material in considering appropriate compensation for the procedurally unfair dismissal.
123. I note that the apparent delays by the Respondent in confirming or approving appointments (and even the indications that salary payments would often be delayed) tends to show the reasonableness of the Applicant’s understanding or belief that it was business as usual beyond 30 June 2025 and that she should continue working, based on the Principal’s probable instruction to do so.
124. It is perhaps notable that the nomination form for her appointment in January 2025, which reflects that the term of the Applicant’s appointment was 1 January to 30 June 2025, was signed on 8 January 2025, after she had started in terms of that contract.
125. Ms. Ngqokombe submitted in her closing statement that it would be unfair for the Department to be liable for the work performed by the Applicant without the approval of the relevant authorities of the Department. It is important to note that the Applicant worked at the behest of the Principal, the duly authorised representative of the Department at the school.
126. Ms. Ngqokombe also submitted that if the Applicant was to be paid, it would create a precedent that one can work without any appointment letter and without any contract of employment. She said that then, anyone would be able to wake up, go to school and later create a claim with the council. It is important to note that the Applicant was not simply working of her own volition but at the instruction of the Principal who, as Mpondombini testified, manages and oversees what happens in the school on behalf of the Department.
127. The CCMA Guidelines on Misconduct Arbitration (“the Arbitration Guidelines”) set out, with reference to case law, relevant factors to be considered when awarding compensation, as well as factors for consideration in awarding compensation in cases involving substantive unfairness and procedural unfairness.
128. The Arbitration Guidelines include “the nature and reason for the dismissal” as a factor for consideration.
129. The Arbitration Guidelines include as a factor for consideration in determining compensation: “…any conduct of the parties that undermines the objects of the Act”.
130. In Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Tshishonga [2009] ZALAC 5; (2009) 30 ILJ 1799 (LAC), held as follows at para 18 (own emphasis added):

“The question thus is what is just and equitable in circumstances where the compensation is for non-patrimonial loss. In this connection, some assistance can be gained from the jurisprudence relating to the award of a solatium in terms of the actio injuriarum. In these cases the award is, subject to one exception of a non-patrimonial nature, and is in satisfaction of the person who has suffered an attack on their dignity and reputation or an onslaught on their humanity. The exception is for the amount relating to the costs of R177000 which were incurred by respondent in having to defend himself, and which are patrimonial by nature. Factors regarded by the court as relevant to the assessment of damages generally included the nature and seriousness of the iniuria, the circumstances in which the infringement took place, the behavior of the defendant (especially whether the motive was honorable or malicious), the extent of the plaintiff’s humiliation or distress, the abuse of a relationship between the parties, and the attitude of the defendant after the iniuria had taken place. It should be noted that this list is not exhaustive in that specific forms of infringement have their own peculiar factors to consider.”

131. The court in Tshishonga confirmed (as the court a quo had) that the purpose of compensation is to redress for patrimonial and non-patrimonial losses.
132. In his Dismissal [3rd ed, Juta & Co (2017) at p 731], J. Grogan writes that compensation is sui generis – the equivalent neither of patrimonial damages nor of damages for personal injury, but a combination of the two.
133. In Lakomski v TTS Tool Techin Systems (Pty) Ltd (JS358/05) [2007] ZALC 112; (2007) 28 ILJ 2775 (LC), the court stated the following at para 41:

“The test in deciding whether compensation should be granted is not whether she has suffered any patrimonial losses. That is a factor that a court may take into account. Other factors to be taken into account are how the applicant was treated, what steps the respondent has taken to comply with the provisions of the Act etc. The compensation that a court may award must be just and equitable in the circumstances…”

134. In Ferodo (Pty) Ltd v De Ruiter (1993) 14 ILJ 974 (LAC), the Labour Appeal Court held that compensation should place dismissed employees in monetary terms in the position they would have been had their unfair dismissal not occurred. However – as is stated in Dismissal [at p 732], with reference to Camdons Realty (Pty) Ltd and another v Hart (1993) 14 ILJ 1008 (LAC) – in determining the amount of compensation a judge or arbitrator should be guided by what is reasonable and fair in the circumstances, and not by a desire to punish the employer.
135. As was held in Foodpiper CC t/a Kentucky Fried Chicken v Shezi (1993) 14 ILJ 126 (LAC) at 136C, dismissed employees are bound to mitigate their loss by seeking alternative employment. The Applicant evidently did this, in working for the SGB as she has since her dismissal.
136. Grogan writes in Dismissal [at p 732] that any benefit granted by an employer to a dismissed employee, such as severance or notice pay, should be considered. I have considered that the Applicant was dismissed without notice, which would have been at least four (4) weeks’ remuneration in terms of the statutory minimum.
137. If the Applicant had worked until the end of what she believed the term of her fixed-term contract to be, she would have been entitled to payment of a total of R97 071.64 until 31 December 2025, comprising the following amounts:

a. R11 200.74 for the remainder of October 2025, from 24 to 31 October (R42 935.45 total monthly remuneration / 23 working days in October 2025 x 6 days she would have worked until 31 October);

b. R42 935.45 for November 2025; and

c. R42 935.45 for December 2025.

138. I have factored in the R20 000.00 received by the Applicant, whether as remuneration or a stipend, for November and December in her SGB role. Anything received by the Applicant prior to that would have been on the Applicant’s version, which is unchallenged or unchallenged by anything substantial in this regard, is an advance and not remuneration.
139. S 195 of the LRA provides as follows:

“An order or award of compensation made in terms of this Chapter is in addition to, and not a substitute for, any other amount to which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract of employment.”

140. Therefore, any salary or remuneration to which the Applicant is entitled for her work from July to late October 2025 must form part of a separate claim, the framework and calculation of which is separate and different from compensation. I have excluded this from my determination.
141. All things considered, in my view, one-and-a-half month’s compensation is just and equitable for the Applicant’s unfair dismissal. This amounts to R64 403.18 (R42 935.45 monthly remuneration x 1.5 months).

Claim for statutory monies

142. Based on the jurisdictional ruling previously issued, it seems the Applicant would have a claim for remuneration owing to her for the period worked from 1 July 2025 until 22 or 23 October 2025.
143. However, the case law (including Chimphondah v Housing Investment Partners and Others (Case number: JR1195/19, handed down on 31 May 2021) and Safeguard Chemicals t/a Maris Polymers South Africa v Frydas and Others (JR631/20) [2022] ZALCJHB 359 (20 October 2022)) provides that s 74(2) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997, in terms of which claims for statutory monies may be consolidated with unfair dismissal disputes, is inapplicable to employees earning above the relevant threshold in terms of that Act. Therefore, I do not have the jurisdiction to deal with this claim.

AWARD

144. I find that the dismissal of the Applicant, Perciance Taazadza, by the Respondent, the Western Cape Education Department, is or was procedurally unfair and substantively fair.
145. The Respondent is ordered to pay the Applicant a total amount of R64 403.18 (sixty-four thousand four hundred and three rand and eighteen cents), in respect of compensation for her unfair dismissal, by no later than 30 June 2026.
146. The total amount listed herein, of R64 403.18, must be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant by no later than 30 June 2026. In the event of default, interest at the prescribed rate shall accrue daily on any amount remaining unpaid from the date of this award.

Miles Chennells
ELRC Panellist