Commissioner: Zoliswa Taba
Case No: ELRC 408-26/27NC
Date of Award: 16 November 2026
In the ARBITRATION between:
LAZARUS ROESTOF APPLICANT
And
NORTHERN CAPE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION RESPONDENT
ELRC 183-26/27 NC ARBITRATION AWARD
Details of hearing and representation
- The present dispute between the Applicant and the Respondent was arbitrated in terms of clause 17 of the Education Labour Relations Council (henceforth referred to as “the ELRC”) Constitution read with section 138 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, as amended (‘the LRA’).
- The arbitration hearing sat on 2 October 2026, 2 November and 3 November 2026. On 2 October 2026, only preliminary issues were dealt with, and evidence was heard on 2 and 3 November 2026. Mr A. Leboko, the Respondent’s labour relations official appeared for the Respondent. Mr Liphuko, a legal representative from Matlejwane Attorneys appeared for the Applicant. The proceedings were held through MS Teams platform and were digitally recorded. Parties were advised to record on their side in case there were any connection problems, to have a backup recording. Closing arguments were submitted on 6 November 2026. No interpreter was used in the proceedings as parties made no request for such.
Background information
3. The following information is not disputed and is common issues between the parties.
3.1. The Applicant was employed by the Respondent as a principal at Langeberg High School. The Respondent falls in the public service education sector.
3.2. At the time of dismissal, the Applicant earned a gross salary of R 69 446.75 per month.
3.3. Some educators residing at the school hostel deposited rent money in the bank account of the Applicant or his daughter’s bank account with the name, Ms Roestof.
3.4. On 2 October 2025, the Applicant was served with a notice to attend a disciplinary hearing, which did not contain the details of the time, place and venue of the hearing. The notice advised the Applicant that the date of the hearing would be communicated in due time.
3.5. On 29 October 2025, through his legal representative, the Applicant wrote a letter to the Respondent demanding the date, time and place of the disciplinary hearing.
3.6. On 4 November 2026, the Applicant was served with an invitation to attend a disciplinary hearing of 12 November 2025, containing the date, time and venue of the hearing.
3.7. The Applicant was charged with the following offences:
• Charge 1: “You are hereby charged with serious misconduct in terms of Section 18(1) (ee) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998, in that you knowingly and unlawfully diverted school funds into a bank account held in the name of Ms. Roestof, thereby concealing the true recipient and misusing public resources whilst you knew or ought to have known that you are not allowed to do so”.
• Charge 2: “In terms of Section 17(g) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998, you committed any other act which, in any other law that applies to Education in so far as your employment is concerned, which is classified as serious misconduct in that, you contravened Section 37(1) of the South African Schools Act, 1996, by failing to ensure that school funds were managed in accordance with prescribed financial procedures, resulting in unauthorised disbursement whilst you knew or ought to have known that you are not allowed to do so”.
• Charge 3: “In terms of Section 17(g) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998, you committed any act which, in any other law that applies to the education insofar as your employment is concerned, which is classified as serious misconduct in that, your actions constitute fraudulent conduct, as defined under common law and supported by Section 60(1) of the South African Schools Act, in that you used deception to obtain financial benefit from school resources whilst you knew or ought to have known that you are not allowed to do so”.
.
3.8. On 11 November 2025, the Chairperson of the disciplinary hearing postponed the hearing on the basis of a double booking to 18 and 19 December 2025.
3.9. The hearing of 18 and 19 December 2025 did not take place due to the Respondent requesting postponement and the matter was postponed to 28 and 29 January 2026.
3.10. The hearing of 28 and 29 January 2026 was postponed due to the Respondent requesting postponement on 26 January and the matter was postponed by the chairperson to 4 and 5 February 2026.
3.11. The disciplinary hearing went ahead in the absence of the Applicant on 4 February 2026.
3.12. All educators who testified at the arbitration hearing had stayed at the hostel and paid rent into the Applicant’s bank account or to his daughter’s bank account.
3.13. Parties signed a pre-arbitration minute and submitted it as part of their bundles of documents.
- The Respondent called five witnesses for its case as follows: C. Mathobela (“Ms Mathobela”), the chairperson of the hearing; R. Mpyapedi (“Mr Mpyapedi”), educator at the school, K. Maboya (“Mr Maboya”), educator at the school ; J. Van Staden (“Mr Van Staden”), educator at the school and C. Dladla (“Ms Dladla”), an educator at the school. Although the Applicant had intended to call three witnesses, two witnesses were withdrawn on the last day of the arbitration and the Applicant remained the only witness for his case.
- What appears in this award is only an analysis of evidence relevant to the issue in dispute. The parties’ testimonies and arguments are a matter of record and have been considered in coming to a final decision.
The issue to be determined - The issue to be determined is whether the dismissal of the Applicant was procedurally and substantively fair.
Preliminary matters
7. On 2 October 2026, parties made oral submissions on the issue of condonation and legal representation. The Respondent opposed condonation but did not oppose legal representation. After hearing both parties’ submissions, I made an ex tempore ruling granting condonation and granting legal representation. The Respondent also made an application to recall its witness to only come and testify over the appropriateness of the sanction. To follow are short reasons for allowing such applications.
Condonation for the late filing of the dispute
8. After a lengthy engagement, both parties agreed that since the outcome of the appeal was made known to the Applicant on 2 June 2026, the referral ought to have been filed with the ELRC by no later than 2 July 2026. It was common cause that the filling was done on 3 July, a day late. Clearly, the delay is not long and there is no indication that the Applicant intended to abandon his case. Furthermore, granting condonation would not prejudice the Respondent as all witnesses were still available and the Respondent was prepared and ready to proceed with the case. Condonation was therefore granted.
Legal representation
9. From both parties submissions, it was clear that throughout the proceedings leading to the dismissal of the Applicant, his legal representative had been actively involved. Furthermore, the Respondent did not oppose the application for legal representation, as a result, I consented to legal representation.
Recalling of the Respondent’s witness
10. After its last witness, but before closing its case, the Respondent made an application to recall the chairperson to speak to the issue of the appropriateness of the sanction. As a commissioner dealing with an alleged unfair dismissal dispute, I am required to also deal with the appropriateness of the sanction in the event it is found that the charges were proved. The Applicant opposed the request. The request was allowed on the basis that it was only for the purpose of evidence based on the appropriateness of the sanction not as an indirect re-examination which may prejudice the Applicant. The Applicant was given an opportunity to cross examine the testimony on the appropriateness of the sanction.
Analysis of evidence and arguments
11. I am required to decide whether the dismissal of the Applicant by the Respondent was procedurally and substantively fair. Section 138(7)(a) of the LRA enjoins me to provide brief reasons for my findings. The dismissal of the Applicant is not in dispute in this matter. Therefore, the Respondent bears the onus of proving on a balance of probabilities that the dismissal was fair.
Procedural fairness
12. The Applicant challenges procedural fairness on the following three grounds:
- postponement of the disciplinary enquiry exceeded 90 days from the date of suspension of the Applicant.
- Failure of the Respondent to provide the Applicant with a notice of disciplinary enquiry that includes the main evidence on which the Respondent was to rely on.
- Continuing with the disciplinary hearing in the absence of the Applicant.
- With regard to the postponement from the date the Applicant was suspended, I clearly informed the parties that the matter I am seized with is a dismissal matter and I would not be appropriate to rule on any issue pertaining to a suspension as such case was never filed with the ELRC and was not before me. If it was the intention of the Applicant to challenge the timeframe of the suspension, such ought to have been done under an unfair labour practice dispute. The Applicant did not pursue this ground further.
Failure of the Respondent to provide the Applicant with a notice of disciplinary enquiry that includes the main evidence on which the Respondent was to rely on.
14. It was the undisputed testimony of the Applicant that the notice of the disciplinary hearing issued to him in October 2025 did not contain the main evidence which the Respondent intended to rely on. He further testified that he contacted the Respondent requesting such information, but nothing came forth. This testimony was not disputed by the Respondent, as such, it remains unchallenged and it stands.
- Item 5(2)(a) of schedule 2 of the EEA provides as follows: “The written notice of the disciplinary hearing must … contain a description of the allegations of misconduct and the main evidence on which the employer will rely”. (underlining, my emphasis)
- The above provision is mandatory as the word “must” is used. Since the Applicant’s testimony was not challenged and that no evidence was produced or was led proving that the main evidence was contained in the notice issued, the Respondent therefore failed to comply with the requirements of this provision.
Continuing with the disciplinary hearing in the absence of the Applicant
17. Ms Mathobela testified that she satisfied herself that the Employee had been aware of the date of the hearing, venue and time prior to proceeding with the hearing in the absence of the Applicant. She conceded during cross examination that the initial notice of the hearing, which was issued in October 2025 had no details of the hearing but maintained that the information was later shared with the Applicant.
- It is common cause that the notice was issued without the date, time and venue of the hearing. It is further common cause that the Applicant requested the omitted information about the details of the hearing on 29 October 2025 and such information was issued to him on 4 November 2025 indicating that the hearing will take place on 12 November 2025 at 10:00. It is common cause that the hearing was postponed by Ms Mathobela citing double booking. The hearing was to be held in December but was postponed to January 2026 at the request of the Respondent.
- Ms Mathobela conceded during cross examination that the hearing of January 2026 was postponed at the request of the Respondent and emails were shared between the parties. She disputed that the date and venue for the hearing of 4 and 5 February 2026 was not communicated to the Applicant.
- The email communication submitted as evidence, which is the communication between Ms Mathobela, the Respondent and the Applicant’s representative is not in dispute. Ms Mathobela’s email postponing the hearing to 4 and 5 February was sent to the parties on 26 January 2026. In terms of this email, no time and venue was recorded, and parties were not advised on that email that the previous time and venue still applied. What the email indicated was this “The employer is directed to finalize all logistical arrangements well in advance of the rescheduled dates”. No evidence was led that prior to 4 February, the Respondent or Ms Mathabela advised the Applicant of the venue and time of the hearing. Furthermore, during cross examination, Ms Mathobela did not dispute that her postponement email failed to refer to the venue and time or that it advised the Applicant that the previous time and venue remained unchanged.
- It was Ms Mathobela’s testimony that if there was any issue with the time and venue, the Applicant ought to have raised that earlier not on the day of the hearing. Although I agree with her sentiments, this does not absolve the Respondent from its responsibility to comply with schedule 2, item 5(2)(b) of the EEA .
- It cannot be accepted that the responsibility must now be shifted to the Applicant to follow up on information he ought to have received from the beginning. Firstly, when the notice of 2 October was issued, such notice was not compliant as it did not contain the time, date and venue of the hearing. The Respondent failed to lead evidence on why such notice lacked such crucial information. It is common cause that the Applicant was the one who wrote to the Respondent on 29 October requesting the details of the hearing. Again, on 26 February when the hearing was postponed, no communication was made as to the relevant details of the hearing of 4 and 5 February. The Respondent could not simply assume that the Applicant would know the time, more so if the previous seatings were not sat down for the same time.
- The email sent on 4 February by the Applicant’s representative pointing out that the hearing times for previous postponements were different, that the hearing of November was for 10:00am and the hearing of December was for 09:00am was not disputed by Ms Mathobela during her cross examination and when she responded to such email. Although she received such email raising concerns about the time and venue, when responding to the email on 4 February, she simply indicated that the initial charge sheet, had details of time, venue and details and such information remained unchanged. It was for the first time in her response to the Applicant on 4 February, she mentioned 10:00am as the starting time and confirmed the venue as unchanged.
- The Applicant testified that due to the lack of clear communication regarding the time and venue, and the failure of the Respondent to provide him with the main evidence he had requested, he could not prepare properly for his case hence his representative alerted Ms Mathobela of the issue and requested postponement on the day.
- In terms of the email sent by the Applicant’s representative after Ms Mathobela for the first time alerted him that the time of the case was at 10:00, the Applicant immediately requested postponement. It is Ms Mathobela’s testimony that she did not see the email until the next day. This testimony is unreasonable. For someone who has been communicating with the Applicant’s representative back and forth with emails on the morning of the hearing, it is unreasonable for her not to have taken steps to confirm, prior to proceeding in the absence of the Applicant, whether there was any response to her last email.
- In terms of the undisputed email submitted as evidence, the Applicant requested postponement prior to 10:00am. Although it is common knowledge that postponement is not for the taking, prior to proceeding in the absence of the Applicant, since she was aware of the complaint filed by the Applicant’s representative on the day, Ms Mathobela ought to have taken steps to confirm the whereabouts of the Applicant. Had she done so, or checked for any response to her last email, she would have seen the request for postponement. If she held a view that there was no basis for postponement, she ought to have responded to the Applicant’s representative and advise him to attend in person to request postponement or simply entertain such on email as previously done and remind the Applicant that the hearing would proceed in absence, if she found no reason to reschedule the matter, this was simply not done.
- Regarding previous postponements, it is common cause that none of the postponements were requested by the Applicant. It must be noted that with the third postponement, which was requested by the Respondent, Ms Mathobela clearly indicated on her ruling for postponement on 26 January that the Respondent’s request for postponement “reflected poor preparation and a lack of respect for the seriousness of these proceedings”. She further stated on that email that postponement is granted “notwithstanding the employer’s poor handling of arrangements”.
- Taking into consideration all these postponements and that they were not requested by the Applicant but were granted even where Ms Mathabela indicated that they were because of poor preparations, I see no reasonable explanation why the Applicant’s application for postponement was not reasonably considered. It is common cause that the Applicant filed for an internal appeal. The Respondent had an opportunity to allow such appeal based on the defective notice and allow the Applicant to be properly heard; such was not done.
- The notice of the disciplinary hearing issued in October 2025 was defective as it did not contain the details of the hearing. Even if it could be argued that the invite sent on 4 November 2025 cured the defect as such details were contained, such cannot be true as it still did not contain the main evidence. No evidence was led that at anytime during the various postponements or prior to the hearing of 4 February the Respondent provided the Applicant with the main evidence. What is evident is that even on 4 February when the Applicant requested postponement, there was still no proper notice in line with Schedule 2, item 5(2)(a) & (b) of the EEA which was issued, therefore, proceeding with the disciplinary hearing in the face of all these defects denied the Applicant his right to be heard.
- I, therefore, find that the dismissal was procedurally unfair.
Substantive fairness
31. The Applicants challenges his guilt on all three charges. I will therefore deal with each charge individually.
Charge 1: “You are hereby charged with serious misconduct in terms of Section 18(1) (ee) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998, in that you knowingly and unlawfully diverted school funds into a bank account held in the name of Ms. Roestof, thereby concealing the true recipient and misusing public resources whilst you knew or ought to have known that you are not allowed to do so”.
- Section 18(1) (ee) of the EEA speaks to a misconduct relating to committing an act of dishonesty. Mr Mpyapedi, Mr Maboya, Mr Van Staden and Ms Dladla all testified about the same issue. They all testified that they were advised to pay the monthly rental amount of R800.00 into the Applicant’s personal bank account using his cell phone number. Mr Mpyapedi testified that he was a member of the School Governing Body (“SGB”), on the teacher component side. His testimony was that the SGB resolved that the rental money must be paid into the Applicant’s account but failed to produce any SGB document supporting his evidence.
- The Applicant confirmed that the money was paid into a personal bank account other than the schools’ account but maintained that it was the SGB’s decision that the rental amount be deposited into his personal account. The Applicant confirmed during cross examination that the schools‘ bank account was operational. He conceded that he was aware that it was wrong to divert school funds to a personal account but maintained that such was necessary to address the hostel day to day issues as it was a lengthy process to release money from the schools’ account. The Applicant failed to testify on the alleged process he referred to which made it impossible to use the school bank account.
- The Applicant did not produce any document from the SGB meeting where a resolution was taken that school funds were to be diverted into his personal account or into Ms Roestof’s account.
- Section 37 of the South African Schools Act (“SASA”) , makes it mandatory for all money received by a public school to be paid into the official school bank account. Even if there was a resolution or written proof to divert the funds, of which there is none submitted, the SGB, including the Applicant, have no legal authority to override the law.
- The Applicant’s version is that the funds were paid into his minor daughter’s account linked to his profile. None of the witnesses testified that they were informed prior to depositing the money, that the rent was being deposited into the Applicant’s daughter’s account. The educators’ testimonies was that they were paying using the Applicant’s personal cell phone number given to them. It was also not the Applicant’s testimony that the SGB took a resolution that the money must be deposited into his daughter’s account. It was further not his testimony that after deciding to use the alleged daughter’s account, he alerted the SGB and those paying the rent that the recipient was his daughter, as her account had been used.
- The undisputed evidence in the form of bank deposit slips submitted by the Respondent indicates that the deposits were made into Ms Roedolfs account. By his own version, the purported permission from the SGB was limited to using his personal account, in that the rent was to be paid into his private account not into any other person’s account (underling, my emphasis).
- The Applicant did not explain why he chose to use the alleged daughter’s account instead of his own as allegedly permitted by the SGB. He simply indicated that the alleged daughter’s account was linked to his profile. Even if such third party’s account is linked to his profile on the backend, on the face of the banking records, his involvement is hidden behind another person’s name. Besides his bare allegation that the bank account was his minor daughter’s account, the Applicant did not submit any proof to support this version. Ms Roestof could be an adult relative, partner or a third party accomplice rather than a minor child under his guardianship. The Applicant is a male and evidence indicates that the funds were paid into a female account holder, with the name, Ms Roedelf. Even if the account belonged to the minor daughter, using a minor child’s account to receive school funds hides the money from the Respondent’s oversite and shields it from the school’s accounting records.
- Clearly, if there is no proof that the SGB was aware that the funds were being paid into any other person’s bank account, other than the Applicant’s own personal account, it is not unreasonable to conclude that by substituting his account with the third party’s account without the SGB knowledge or without a fresh resolution means that he secretly changed the destination of the school funds to a third party, therefore concealing the true recipient. When payers or auditors look at the banking details, the recipient’s name will not be the school or the principal, but a third party, Ms Roedolf.
- Regarding the part of misusing the funds, official funds belong strictly in an official bank account. Depositing school hostel money into a third party creates a strong inference of misuse as the school or the Respondent loses control over such funds. It is not unreasonable to accept that funds deposited into a private account are meant for personal use. Since there is proof that official funds went to a private account, other than the school account, the evidentiary burden is on the Applicant to provide credible proof that the money was not for private use or was not misused but was used for hostel or official purposes.
- The Applicant failed to provide any proof in the form of bank statements from Ms Roedolf’s account and receipts to show that all the money that went into such account was not misused but was used for hostel activities. Failing to produce bank statements or receipts effectively conceals how public resources were used justifying an inference of misuse and dishonesty.
- Based on the evidence before me, I find that the Respondent has proved this charge on balance of probabilities.
Charge 2: “In terms of Section 17(g) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998, you committed any other act which, in any other law that applies to Education in so far as your employment is concerned, which is classified as serious misconduct in that, you contravened Section 37(1) of the South African Schools Act, 1996, by failing to ensure that school funds were managed in accordance with prescribed financial procedures, resulting in unauthorised disbursement whilst you knew or ought to have known that you are not allowed to do so”.
- For a charge of section 17(g) of the EEA to find application, there must be evidence that what is alleged the Applicant did is classified as s serious misconduct under section 37 of the SASA. The Respondent led no evidence to prove that failing to ensure school funds were managed accordingly was classified in section 37 of the SASA as a serious misconduct. Furthermore, section 37(1) of the SASA refers to the SGB establishing a school fund. The charge appears to have been miscategorized. Although the Applicant did not make an issue during the leading of evidence with the categorization of the charge, it is important for a decision maker to deal with this issue as it may play a role in the appropriateness of the sanction in the event the charge is proved.
- The Courts have held that the categorization of the alleged misconduct is of less importance and what is important was for the employer to show that a workplace rule was contravened. The Courts warned that arbitrators “must not adopt too formalistic or technical approach” to disciplinary charges. The key importance is that an employee has adequate information to ascertain the misconduct alleged.
- The factual body of the charge clearly informed the Applicant the exact case he had to meet, namely, “failing to ensure that school funds were managed in accordance with prescribed financial procedures, resulting in an authorized disbursement”. The charge is more consistent with the misconduct under section 18(1) of the EEA relating to mismanagement of school finances than a charge under section 17. It must be noted that the intention is not at all to replace one charge with another but to focus on the factual body of the charge. Evidence was led on the factual body of the charge, and the Applicant was cross examined on this, giving him an opportunity to deny or accept what was put to him.
- The Applicant conceded during cross examination that he received training on the prescribed financial procedure on how to handle school funds. He confirmed during cross examination that he was aware that it was wrong for money to be deposited in a personal account.
- The Labour Appeal Court in Department of Higher Education and Training v GPSSBC & Others , held that “section 37(3) of SASA explicitly dictates that the SGB must open one single banking account in the official name of the school. All school fees, state allocations, and donations must be paid directly into this specific account”.
- In terms of section 16A of SASA, as a Principal, amongst other responsibilities in the SGB, the Applicant had a responsibility to inform the SGB about policy and legislation and assist it with the management of the school’s funds.
- The Applicant conceded during cross examination that he knew the functions of his role as a Principal in the SGB and that he was trained on the procedure to be followed when dealing with school funds. Mr Mpyayedi testified that although he was a member of the SGB, he did not know the procedure to be followed when school funds had to be used. This evidence was not disputed. The Applicant therefore had a responsibility to advise the SGB and assist regarding school fund management. There is no evidence submitted indicating that he did so. Although the Applicant was trained on processes to follow in managing school funds, he still took part in a decision to manage school funds contrary to a known prescribed financial procedure.
- Unauthorised disbursement is the release of payout or transfer of funds without proper approval or outside the established procedure. The Applicant willfully circumvented a rule designed to prevent unauthorized disbursement, when he allowed school funds to be transferred to a third-party account. He failed to produce any proof that he had advised the SGB against the alleged decision they took to act contrary to the required procedure when dealing with school funds. When asked why a separate hostel account was not opened and used for the hostel transactions, his response was that such needed an application to be made to the Head of the Department but failed to explain what prevented such application to be made. Clearly, evidence indicates that the Applicant was aware of the procedure to be followed when dealing with school funds, yet he failed to ensure that school funds were managed in accordance with prescribed financial procedures.
- The Respondent has on balance of probabilities proved this charge.
Charge 3: “In terms of Section 17(g) of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998, you committed any act which, in any other law that applies to the education insofar as your employment is concerned, which is classified as serious misconduct in that, your actions constitute fraudulent conduct, as defined under common law and supported by Section 60(1) of the South African Schools Act, in that you used deception to obtain financial benefit from school resources whilst you knew or ought to have known that you are not allowed to do so”.
- Section 60(1) refers to the liability of the state. The Respondent led no evidence in relation to anything relating to this section and led no evidence regarding the allegation of fraud. Furthermore, no evidence was led on the factual body of the charge that there was deception to obtain financial benefit.
- The Respondent has therefore failed to prove this charge.
Appropriateness of the sanction
54. In terms of the EEA, dismissal is mandatory if an employee is found guilty of a misconduct under section 17 of the EEA but if found guilty of misconduct other than the one listed in section 17, evidence would be assessed to decide the appropriateness of the sanction. The Respondent has proved the Employee’s guilt on charge 1 and 2. Charge 1 is based on section 18, and although charge 2 was based on section 17, the facts of the case do not support a misconduct under section 17 as already stated. Since there is no guilt finding in relation to section 17, dismissal is therefore not mandatory. I am awake to the fact that dismissal may also be ordered regarding misconducts falling outside section 17.
- When one considers what the Applicant has been found guilty on, the charges touch on dishonesty and failing to ensure that school funds are managed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The Applicant testified that he was aware that it was wrong to divert school funds into a personal account, yet he participated in making such a decision and allowed such to happen.
- The Applicant was aware when he received the charges that the issue against him related to the funds which were deposited into an account which he claimed belonged to his daughter. As per his testimony, he had access to such an account, therefore, nothing prevented him from downloading the bank statements to submit them as proof that the money was not misused irrespective of the diversion.
- The Applicant was always legally represented from the time he received the first notice to attend the disciplinary hearing. If he needed receipts of the hostel expenditure, and he was under the impression that such information was in the possession of the Respondent, he had ample time to apply for such information to be disclosed, this he did not do. As things stands, there is no accountability on the school funds which were diverted to a third party under his watch. What the evidence shows, is that school funds were simply deposited into Ms Roedolf’s account, but what happened to such money afterwards, is still a question left unanswered.
- The charge against the Applicant borders on trust. In its closing argument, it was the Respondent’s argument that the trust relationship has irretrievably broken down as the Applicant held a position of authority and trust. On the other hand, the Applicant’s argued that he was not guilty of the charges and failed to make any arguments of a lesser sanction in the event his guilt was proven.
- The Applicant, as a Principal holds a position of trust and acts as the primary accounting officer in terms of section 16 of SASA, entrusted with safeguarding public funds meant for learners’ education and welfare. By failing to ensure that the school funds were managed within the prescripts of the law which he is aware of, and which he intentionally contravened and behaving in a way which borders on dishonesty, he has broken the trust relationship.
- Section 18(5) of the EEA provide for a dismissal if one is found guilty of acts relating to dishonesty. The Applicant does not take any accountability with his actions or with the role he played in diverting school funds, as a result, he is not a candidate for progressive discipline. There are no compelling, exceptional circumstances argued justifying a lesser sanction than that of dismissal.
- I find that dismissal was an appropriate sanction. The dismissal is therefore substantively fair.
Remedy
62. Since the dismissal is found to be procedurally unfair but substantively fair, section 193 of the LRA provides for compensation only as remedy. The Constitutional Court in McGregor v PHSDSBC and Others held that although every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed, the infringement of that right does not automatically confer a right to a remedy. It was held that a decision maker must consider a range of factors to determine if compensation should be awarded, and if so, the extent of the compensation. The Court emphasized that compensation flows from the finding as to the quality and nature of a dismissal.
- In this case, the funds which went into the bank account which is known to the Applicant were not accounted for in these proceedings. This is a ground enough not to order any compensation to the Applicant. Although this is the case, I am alive to the fact that the Applicant was unfairly denied his right to be heard prior to being dismissed. The Respondent had apple opportunity to afford the Applicant an opportunity to be heard but chose not to do so.
- I have considered the above facts and the fact that compensation awarded for procedural unfairness is not based on actual or patrimonial loss suffered by an employee, instead, it acts as a solatium for the loss of the right to a fair procedure. It is not meant to punish an employer or reward an employee for the misconduct committed.
- I find it fair to order compensation equivalent to the Applicant’s one months’ salary. It is common cause that the Applicant earned R 69 446.75 per month. Compensation is calculated as follows: R 69 446.75 x 1 month.
Award - The dismissal of Lazarus Roedolf is found to be substantively fair but procedurally unfair.
- As a result of procedural unfairness, the Respondent, Northern Cape Department of Education is ordered to pay as compensation to Mr Roedolf an amount of R 69 446.75.
- The above amount must be paid into Mr Roedolf’s bank account known to the Respondent by no later than 31 December 2026.
- Interest, as set out in section 1 of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1978, will accrue from the time that the total amount stipulated in this award becomes payable.
Panelist: Zoliswa Taba Signature:

